The Role of The Deputy CEO

Deputy CEO roles are structurally difficult to make work well. Not because the individuals appointed into them lack capability, but because the position itself often sits in an inherently ambiguous space between authority, accountability, and succession. BP’s recent appointment of a Deputy CEO has brought the role back into focus and raises an important leadership question for boards and executive teams alike: when does creating a second-in-command strengthen an organisation, and when does it simply expose deeper uncertainty at the top?¹

Companies rarely introduce Deputy CEO roles when circumstances are straightforward. More often, the position emerges during periods of significant pressure or transition: major transformation programmes, portfolio restructuring, operational complexity, investor scrutiny, or unresolved succession planning. In BP’s case, the company is navigating all these simultaneously. That does not mean the appointment is misguided. In fact, it may prove to be a highly effective response to the scale of change underway. But evidence suggests these structures are considerably harder to execute successfully than many boards anticipate.

The core challenge is organisational clarity. At senior levels of leadership, two things matter above all else: who has the authority to make decisions? And who carries accountability for outcomes? Deputy CEO roles can unintentionally blur both. In many organisations, the position exists somewhere between a COO, a successor, and a peer to the CEO, without being fully defined as any one of them. When that ambiguity exists at the top of an organisation, it rarely remains isolated there. It filters down into decision-making processes, organisational behaviour, and culture.

Research into shared leadership and second-in-command executive structures consistently highlights this problem. Studies examining COO models and dual leadership arrangements show that these structures only succeed when authority boundaries are explicit and internally understood. Where responsibilities overlap or remain politically sensitive, organisations often experience slower decision-making, diluted accountability, and increasing executive tension. Importantly, these issues do not usually appear as dramatic failures. More often, they emerge gradually through delayed execution, inconsistent priorities, and organisational hesitation around who ultimately owns key decisions.

This is why many Deputy CEO roles do not fail publicly or catastrophically. They underperform quietly. The organisation continues to function, but leadership becomes less efficient, internal alignment weakens, and momentum slows over time. Boards can mistake this for normal organisational complexity when the leadership structure itself is contributing to the drag.

And yet, despite these risks, boards continue to create the role because the pressures driving the decision are entirely real. Modern CEOs are operating in increasingly demanding environments shaped by geopolitical instability, regulatory pressure, activist investors, technology disruption, and large-scale transformation agendas. In some businesses, the operational and strategic load genuinely becomes too broad for one individual to manage effectively. A strong second-in-command can therefore create significant value.

There are examples where second-in-command leadership models have worked exceptionally well. Sheryl Sandberg’s partnership with Mark Zuckerberg at Meta is frequently cited, with Sandberg acting as de factor Deputy CEO. The relationship succeeded because the division of responsibility was clear and complementary. Zuckerberg focused on product vision and long-term strategic direction, while Sandberg drove operational scaling, commercial execution, and organisational management. Similarly, Gwynne Shotwell’s role at SpaceX has been highly effective because operational execution and strategic ambition are clearly separated between her and Elon Musk. In both examples, authority was differentiated rather than overlapping.

This distinction matters. Successful second-in-command models are built on complementary leadership, not ambiguous leadership. They work because the organisation understands where power sits and how decisions flow. The problem with many Deputy CEO appointments is not the existence of a number two, but the absence of clear structural intent.

Succession adds another layer of complexity. Many Deputy CEO appointments are, in practice, succession structures that boards are reluctant to describe openly. The title becomes a way of signalling potential future leadership without fully committing to it. But ambiguity at that level can create its own political consequences. The Deputy CEO may lack full authority, the CEO may appear partially shadowed, and the executive team can begin interpreting signals rather than focusing entirely on execution. Strong succession pipelines are rarely built through ambiguity. They are built through accountability, operational ownership, and visible leadership responsibility.

To return to BP, the company is managing significant strategic and operational change, and there is a credible argument that a genuine second-in-command could help absorb complexity and accelerate execution. But that outcome will depend entirely on whether the role carries real authority, clear accountability, and defined separation from the CEO position. Without those conditions, the risk is not dramatic failure. It is slower execution, softer alignment, and gradual organisational friction. It is an appointment worth watching very closely.